Lessons Learned
Enduring success will only be delivered by the Afghan, not London or NATO; we must endeavour to empower them at the Kabul and local level by all means
Brigadier Butler, Commander UK Task Force
Motivation, equipment and training were, as so often with the British Army, key factors in their successful performance. The application of basic standards, whether relating to firing positions or food and water, proved vital. Difficulties arose mainly from a shortage of personnel and equipment, particularly helicopters.
The limitations on the size of the force deployed to Helmand and their deployment to district centres and other outposts meant that troops were thinly spread across the province. This severely restricted the Brigade’s capability to move, manoeuvre and crucially, take the initiative. Once committed, withdrawal from these posts could send the wrong message to the civilian population and the Taleban.
16 Air Assault Brigade’s Command regarded the sixth month tour as the ‘break-in’ battle for Helmand Province and provided the foundations for other troops to build on.
In Conclusion
They've gone through pretty much hell at various stages of this deployment. They've lost some fine men, and very close friends and colleagues. But they've soldiered on and maintained the ethos that you would expect from 16 Air Assault Brigade.
Lt Col Andy Price
While many of the soldiers deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 valued their experience, many would be happy never to repeat it. The loss of comrades and the perception, by some, that hard fought gains were all too quickly lost, had a profound effect.
On 6 February 2008 Defence Secretary Des Browne announced plans for 16 Air Assault Brigade to replace 52 Infantry Brigade in Afghanistan in April 2008.
The NAM would like to thank all the members of 16 Air Assault Brigade who provided material for, and assistance with the exhibition.
